Fantastic article by James Fallows at The Atlantic:
"In a report for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission late last year, Northrop Grumman prepared a time line of electronic intrusions and disruptions coming from sites inside China since 1999. In most cases it was impossible to tell whether the activity was amateur or government-planned, the report said. But whatever their source, the disruptions were a problem. And in some instances, the 'depth of resources' and the 'extremely focused targeting of defense engineering data, US military operational information, and China-related policy information' suggested an effort that would be 'difficult at best without some type of state-sponsorship.'"
Later in the article Fallows provides an interview excerpt which in short says the most consequential cyber threats aren't 15-year old kids looking for trouble, but rather mature, sophisticated and well-funded cadres. I concur. Large scale cybercrime or conflict requires time, expertise and coordination to pull off: just like conventional or even unconventional conflict (even terrorism isn't cheap). Furthermore:
"...nearly everyone in the business believes that we are living in, yes, a pre-9/11 era when it comes to the security and resilience of electronic information systems. Something very big—bigger than the Google-China case—is likely to go wrong, they said, and once it does, everyone will ask how we could have been so complacent for so long. Electronic-commerce systems are already in a constant war against online fraud."
Indeed. You see, the problem with intelligence analysis and early warning is no one knows when you're successful. Alas, everyone knows when you fail. I assure you there are many motivivated security professionals out there working day and night to stop the big one.
Sometimes the bad guys win.
When they do, though, successful contingency plans separate the organizational wheat from the chaff. The organization that quickly triages and adapts to circumstances survives: the organization that fails at damage control will be paralyzed at best, and fall apart at worst. Furthermore:
"This led to another, more surprising theme: that the main damage done to date through cyberwar has involved not theft of military secrets nor acts of electronic sabotage but rather business-versus-business spying."
There's big money to be made in competitive intelligence (i.e. legal spying on companies based on mining open-source information), and that's simple data mining. But there's even bigger money to be made in cracking another company's electronic safe. In my opinion, the best cyberdefense tricks don't' come from the military, but from the business sector.
Good reading--check out the rest of the article here.
-